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Abstract
This paper examines Kant’s metaphor of reason as an island in the Critique of Pure Reason in 
order to suggest an unresolved tension at the heart of his critical project, which is addressed 
in a different way in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. That tension is between 
the transcendental circumscription of pure reason and reason’s on persistent pretensions 
to transcendence. Kant’s model of transcendence is contrasted with two phenomenolog-
ical models that attempt to articulate the desiderative nature of reason. Yet, precisely on 
this question of motivation differences between Husserl and Heidegger become clear and 
instructive. The paper concludes, in view of these differences, with a proposal for conceiving 
of transcendence in non-topological categories, but instead as the activity of questioning.   
Keywords: Transcendence, Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, Phenomenology
I. The Island of Truth
If, as Ricoeur advises us, the symbol gives rise to thought1, then perhaps the symbol of the island of truth from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can 
orient us here. The metaphor opens Kant’s famous section distinguishing 
phenomena and noumena. He writes:
This domain [of pure understanding] is an island, enclosed by nature 
itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth – enchanting name! 
– surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, 
where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the 
deceptive appearances of farther shores, deluding the adventurous sea-
1  The phrase first appears in an article of the same title, “Le symbole donne  penser”, 
Esprit 27/7-8 (1959). It appears again in his The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967 (Original French ed., 1960)): 247-57.
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farer ever a new with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises 
which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.2 
Here Kant presents to us an image of reason within “unalterable limits.” 
These limits are ones with which we are “under compulsion to be satis-
fied.” It is an image of a reason bounded, of reason de-limited and de-fined. 
It is an image of reason con-fined, at least in its “successful” employment. 
Kant, we might say, performs an Akedah.3 He binds the understanding as 
Abraham did Isaac, that it might serve a single, salvific purpose and lead 
us from the slavery of metaphysical illusion to freedom. And yet, at the 
same time, Kant is too astute an observer to be satisfied with the image as 
such.  It must be set within a broader landscape. The image of reason as 
an island, as bound on all sides, contains in its very conceptualization that 
in virtue of which the island is an island, viz., the ocean that surrounds it. 
This ocean, always tempestuous on Kant’s telling, is a metaphor for, well, 
what, exactly? Illusion and deception, according to Kant. But Kant of course, 
stands on the island. Those who take to the stormy seas court freedom of 
thought, but also possible death. Melville tells us that Ishmael takes to sea 
as “a substitute for pistol and ball,”4 and that to set forth on the sea is to 
court suicide; it is to be surrounded on all sides – again, bound – by death. 
What is it that holds out at once death and freedom to reason? Kant 
does not specify the metaphor further, but only suggests it is that which 
entices reason; that which is desirable to it. Yet, with this suggestion, the 
symbol of the island reveals itself to be only a partial metaphor, or rather, 
an act of circumscription that seeks to identify all of reason with one aspect 
of reason. This is inadequate, even on Kant’s telling, because it is reason 
itself that is not content with the island, not content to be bound to the safe, 
measured, and measurable terra firma, but instead desires – and it always 
desires on Kant’s telling – to set forth in search of the “farther shores” of a 
terra incognita. But why should reason be desirous of such things? Moreover, 
and more importantly for the phenomenologist, if it is the case that reason 
always steps over (tran-scendere) its bounds, what are we to make of this 
essential feature? What is it that entices it beyond the bounds of its quan-
titative and conceptual confinement? How does it stand in relation to this 
desirous intending: is reason in some sense desire?  
In order to curb its inordinate desire, reason is neutered by Kant by 
distinction and transformation. 
We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely 
within the limits of possible experience, immanent; and those, on the other 
2  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). Ibid., A235-36/B294-95.
3  See Genesis 22: 1-19. The term occurs in v. 10. 
4  Hermann Melville, Moby-Dick, eds. Hershel Parker and Harrison Hayford (W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1999), 18.
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hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent. [These 
latter are] actual principles which incite us to tear down all those bound-
ary-fences and to seize possession of an entirely new domain which 
recognizes no limits of demarcation. Thus, transcendental and transcendent 
are not interchangeable terms.5
Thus, we first distinguish between immanent and transcendent employ-
ments of reason, and then, second, transform the historical (and ontological) 
understanding of the transcendent into the epistemological understanding 
of transcendental, i.e., the conditions of possibility. In this bit of alchemy, the 
transcendent has evolved from referring to “that which surpasses” (tran-
scendens) all kinds of being while including them, to that which surpasses 
any particular form of immanence as its prior and necessary condition of 
possibility. The transcendent(al) is no longer that which “goes beyond,” 
but rather that which “underlies.” 
Yet, while such distinctions may help isolate a pure (reinen) or bare (blo-
ßen) employment of reason, they do not account for its desirous intending. 
And while Kant’s “phenomenology” of reason begins from the observa-
tion that it is unable to avoid desiring more than it can have, he does not 
return to the relationship between reason and desire. What reason desires 
is clear enough: truth about the last things and the highest things – God, 
Immortality, and Freedom. These are of course also religious things. 
The insufficiency of the Kantian account (not to say its inaccuracy) is 
further demonstrated when we consider how he argues for his position. 
Having shown the restriction of reason is a possibility, when Kant argues 
for its necessity he can only advance an historical argument: the scandal of 
philosophical difference (the dogmatists, sceptics, Hume, Locke) has led 
to “indifferentism” (Ax) and metaphysics, once queen of the sciences now 
mourns like Hecuba. Thus, it is the history of philosophical disagreement 
that justifies the legislation of reason by Kant’s “tribunal.” Yet, here we 
might press the philosopher from Knigsberg:  Why is it that reason, of 
its very nature, desires to climb over (tran – scendere) the limits of its safe 
employment?6 And is there a properly philosophical warrant for restricting 
or re-defining reason according to a more limited set of its possibilities?7 
5  Kant, op. cit., A296/B352.
6  We need not press him to concede the point. He opens the “Preface to the First Edition” 
with the claim that: “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge 
it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able 
to ignore, but which, as transcending all tis powers, it is also not able to answer” (Avii). 
7  Gadamer, summarizing Hegel’s critique of Kant puts this point well: In distinguishing 
between phenomena and noumena, “reason was proving this distinction to be its own. In 
doing so it by no means comes up against its own limits, rather reason has itself set this limit 
and that means it has already gone beyond that limit. What makes a limit a limit always 
includes knowledge of what is on both sides of it. It is the dialectic o the limit to exist only 
by being superceded.” The passage occurs in Truth and Method, trans. Weinsheimer and 
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2006), 338.
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Kant claims, famously, to have found it necessary “to deny knowledge, in 
order to make room for faith” (Bxxx), but we might ask if he has not rather 
de-fined reason so as to preclude from its phenomenality precisely that which 
since Plato and Aristotle has been the source of its dignity: to strive for and 
comport in accord with what is most divine in us.8 By binding reason, Kant 
enables reason to bind that after which it seeks. Or rather, it may only seek 
that which is able to be bound (“We can know a priori of things only what 
we ourselves put into them” (Bxviii)). In this sense, to bind is at once to bring 
into view, but also to hide from view. In order to see clearly, for Kant, we 
must see less. And is it not the God of Israel who proves too concrete and 
too particular for the universal legislation of reason? Who, having brought 
the wood for the sacrifice, is then bound and placed upon it? Such is the 
argument of Kant’s final “critique,” Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 
or, more to our point here, religion bound by bare reason. Yet, it is precisely 
here that cords begin to fray: both those that bind reason and those by which 
reason binds. The shift from pure to bare reason in Die Religion shows that 
the attempted circumscription of pure reason in the first Critique (and, in a 
different way, that of practical reason in the second Critique) was insufficient. 
Reason, of itself, requires other and legitimate forms of inquiry.  
In Die Religion Kant again seeks to draw a boundary between reason 
and unreason. Yet, it requires him to engage in a hermeneutic detour that, 
even while it colonizes theology with philosophy, nonetheless “comes to 
suggest that autonomy is in some measure a result that involves at least 
preliminary concessions to another discourse [i.e., theology] as having 
alethic properties that philosophy [pure and practical] does not have.”9 
Reason can only redraw the boundary by reading and interpreting the text 
of scripture and so moves from a critical employment to a hermeneutical 
one. This is paradoxical insofar as it requires reason to acknowledge the 
good of the other discourse even while it takes the very concession as a 
license to ignore and discard much of it.10 Here, reason “endures the pathos 
of its own limitations; reason ‘suffers’ the other discourse in its openness and 
hospitality for it; and reason enacts an interpretation of religious discourse 
in which it not only performs a humane service, but makes itself more than it 
would have been had it remained within its own borders.”11 Thus, the bounds of 
8  “But such a [rational and contemplative] life would be too high for man; for it is not in 
so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; 
and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that 
which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with 
man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
trans. W. D. Ross, Book X, §7.  
9  Cyril O’Regan, “Boundaries, Blind Spots, and Supplements”, in Christianity and Secular 
Reason, ed. J. Bloechl (Notre Dame: UND Press, 2012), 89. 
10  Ibid., 97
11  Ibid., 97-98 – emphasis mine. Concretely, O’Regan suggests it corrects the deficits 
of (1) the inadequate account of the freedom and responsibility of a self enacting a life in 
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reason are moved – but did not their explanatory power come from their 
“unalterable” status?
Kant shifts our discussion from the transcendent to the transcendental. 
We are told to desire not that which excels and exceeds us, but that which 
we already possess: the conditions of possibility already operative in our 
knowing performance. No doubt, this is a salutary exercise, and it is Kant’s 
particular genius to have seen the necessity of it. But might we be permit-
ted to descend, now, from Mount Moriah? To return to life itself, in the 
tent with Sarah and Eleazar? If we desire more, Kant concedes, reason can 
accommodate religion provided it submits to its immanent domain, itself 
an exercise of eminent domain.12 But in this, philosophy is “counted twice”: 
it is the adjacent discourse to religion vying for authority; yet, it is also the 
standard by which each is to be judged. Despite this perhaps unwarranted 
advancement of the shoreline, the stormy seas have not abated. Even here, 
Kant must supplement his supplement with a further critique of the parerga 
of religion – the experience of grace, miracles, mystery, and acts of charity 
– which are precisely those aspects that claim some sort of contact with 
transcendence. We have yet to escape the tidal pull and so are left with the 
question stated earlier, what is it that characterizes reason in its un-limited 
performance? Not confined to a terrestrial isle but asail amidst the dynamic 
multiplicity of life?
Considering both the Critique and Religion, we arrive at a model of imma-
nence that has been expanded beyond the Cartesian ego cogito to include 
all possible experience that can give itself according to the categories of the 
understanding. In this model, the transcendent (not to be confused with 
the transcendental) is what lies beyond cognition and conceptualization, 
and therefore beyond our possible experience of it. It is not that it cannot 
be – Kant acknowledges the possibility of an intellectual intuition – but that 
it cannot be for us. Such the Kantian verdict; though, as we have seen, the 
borderlands have already begun to tremble. 
II. Two Phenomenological Models 
The Kantian opposition of immanent and transcendent has a long leg-
acy, especially for those who seek to surpass it. Husserl and Heidegger 
both, while challenging Kant’s solution on phenomenological grounds, 
a material and temporal world; (2) the continuity and particular character of such a self; 
(3) how such a self would undergo a “radical change” not determined by material and 
historical environment; (4) the inability to address the concept of moral exemplarity; and 
(5) thinking more substantially about the individual and the community and their mutual 
and interrelated improvement. 
12  Eminent domain is the right of public authority to take private property for public 
use. 
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accept the terms of the debate (with essential modifications). Just as Kant 
modified intuition to circumvent the Cartesian problem, Husserl modi-
fied it to circumvent Kant. Husserl’s account of immanence13 is famously 
articulated in his “principle of all principles.”14 The sphere of such origi-
nary affording intuition is consciousness: “Hence, we will keep our sights 
focused firmly on the sphere of consciousness and study what we find 
immanently in it.”15 Yet, for Husserl, unlike Kant, immanence and tran-
scendence while in one sense opposite are not opposed. In Husserl, the 
primary sense of transcendence is “that which surpasses” in the sense of 
continually moving beyond.  Perception is his signal and privileged exam-
ple. This is key, because unlike Kant, for Husserl much of our experience 
is of transcendence, the perpetual transcendence the world before the 
limited engagement of our perceptual consciousness. In this sense, reason 
(consciousness) is especially concerned with transcendence. Phenomenology 
is, “step[ping] back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks 
from a fire.” 16 
Yet for Husserl, even with an expanded notion of intuition and a model 
in which immanence and transcendence partially overlap, there is still a 
distinction between different forms of transcendence. In particular, to be 
distinguished from the transcendence of the world, is its “polar opposite,” 
the transcendence of God. Such absolute transcendence is distinguished 
from both the absoluteness of consciousness and the transcendence of the 
world: “it would thus be ‘absolute’ in a sense totally different…”17 Thus, 
while immanence has been expanded to accommodate certain forms of tran-
scendence, there remains a transcendence that de-limits even this expanded 
immanence.  
Additionally, in Ideas still we lack, as we did in Kant, any full account 
of why we do not by nature restrict ourselves to immanence, but desire 
beyond it in our knowing. This lack is less obvious and less problematic 
in Husserl, because while Kant starts with reason’s desire for (knowledge 
of) God, Husserl stays closer to the Cartesian problematic and begins from 
doubt of the world.  Yet, set against Husserl’s rich account of our basic believ-
ing in the world (Urdoxa), it is not clear what should motivate us to doubt 
it in the first place. 
13  Husserl begins his “Introduction” to Ideas I by rejecting false accounts of immanence 
as “inner experience” in the Cartesian or Kantian sense. (Dahlstrom, 2014, p.3)
14  Husserl, Ideas I, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Hackett, 2014), §24, “That each intuition 
affording [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge, that what-
ever presents itself to us in “Intuition” in an originary way (so to speak, in its actuality in 
person) is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as, but only within the limitations in 
which it affords itself there.” 
15  Husserl, Ideas I, §33.
16  Maurice Merleau-Ponty. “Preface” in Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 
2002), xiii.
17  Ideas, §58.
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In Heidegger, Husserl’s overlapping spheres of immanence and tran-
scendence become coincident on account of a shared temporal foundation18: 
At the heart of immanence we find the world in its transcendence. In this, 
Heidegger, the historian of philosophy and medieval scholar, unites the 
nova et vetera. Being is both transcendent – transgeneric and transcategorical 
– and transcendental – the condition of possibility. What he adds to these 
accounts is an analysis of its temporal horizon as the ground – and here 
he differs from his Vaterfreund – of all being. Both Dasein and world19 are 
equiprimordial in their transcendence.20 Dasein’s transcendence is towards 
and within the world and the world’s transcendence allows Dasein to be 
itself, a being-in-the-world. Considered from the perspective of Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology reason is not that which binds, but rather that which 
lets something be seen: 
The function of the logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting 
entities be perceived [im Vernehmenlassen], logos can signify the reason. 
[…] As something to which one addresses oneself, becomes visible in its 
relation to something in its ‘relatedness’, logos acquires the signification 
of relation and relationship.21
The root (vernehmen) of the compound verb Heidegger uses here car-
ries the broad sense of “being examined,” but also that of being-heard and 
being-questioned. This opens up an alternative model for thinking about how 
we might conceive of trasncedens because it returns the priority from that 
which can be known to that which can appear. The direct consequence of this is 
to reconceive immanence22 as ek-stasis. We need not, indeed cannot, be content 
with the confines of our island because we always already stand outside it.
18  “And if Dasein’s Being is completely grounded in temporality, then temporality must 
make possible Being-in-the-world and therewith Dasein’s transcendence” (H364). “The tran-
scendence of the world has a temporal foundation” (H389). This is, at the risk of simplifying, 
the phenomenological conclusion of “Division Two” which concludes with the rhetorical 
question: “Does time manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (H437). 
19  Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities yet it pertains 
to every entity. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being 
lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being 
is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive 
in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation. Every 
disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth 
(the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis” (BT, H38).
20  This is not at odds with what Heidegger refers to as the “Christian” notion of transcen-
dence, but it does show that it is in need of a deep ground of explanation: “But the [Christian] 
idea of ‘transcendence’ that man is something that reaches beyond himself-is rooted in 
Christian dogmatics, which can hardly be said to have made an ontological problem of man’s 
Being. The idea of transcendence, according to which man is more than a mere something 
endowed with intelligence, has worked itself out with different variations” (BT, H49). 
21  Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 34. 
22  The term only appears once in Being and Time at H61.
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III. The Question
All three figures we’ve considered frame transcendence and imma-
nence in terms of a topology. Kant, most obviously, provides us with the 
landscape of an island surrounded by stormy seas and later, in search of 
a supplement to pure and practical reason, still conceives of it in terms 
of boundary-drawing in which reason gradually colonizes theology by 
expanding its territory from pure to practical to hermeneutical, redraw-
ing its boundaries to mark off the reasonable from the unreasonable. For 
Husserl, the borderlands are shared, there is a transcendence appropri-
ate to immanence, one that is grasped in immanence. And yet here too 
there remains a demarcation between perceptual and absolute transcen-
dence. Finally, for Heidegger in whom the distinction is least rigid, there 
persists the language and conceptualization of founding and founded. 
Within a topological frame, the realms of immanence and transcendence 
may expand or contract; they may overlap, and even become coincident, 
but the language itself is not neutral. Following Heidegger, we might 
acknowledge that logos (reason) is Rede (discourse),23 and so the manner in 
which we “speak” conditions that which we allow to appear. Topological 
language preserves – whatever the relation it proposes – the signification 
of two distinct spaces moving closer together or father apart and these 
boundaries are perhaps also bindings. 
What might we see in addition or otherwise if we substitute an interroga-
tive model for a topological one? Let us return to the implied but unspecified 
dynamism of Kant’s original image. What if one were to consider tran-
scendence not as a property of perceptual objects, nor as the possibility of 
something that exceeds human intuition, nor as a descriptive category of 
Dasein’s concourse with the world, but rather simply as asking questions: 
as the interrogative posture in which we find ourselves always already in 
the natural attitude and its average everydayness? 
Is it not our questions that lead us beyond the confines of our small 
island? Questions that lead us to desire to account for our experience beyond 
the basic and unquestioned presumption of its givenness? Questions that 
lead us into the world, but also that presuppose it in the ways that they 
press upon us? It is questions that burst the bounds of reason because their 
horizon of possibility is not bound by what can be known, but only by what 
might be asked about.24 
It is suggestive that Husserl provides a “phenomenology of the question” 
in his final and posthumous work, Experience and Judgment where he is 
23  Heidegger, op. cit., 32ff. 
24  Kant himself recognizes a certain a priority to the question and that it is the source of 
our discontent with the island of truth: “We are not satisfied with the exposition merely of 
that which is true, but likewise demand that account be taken of that which we desire to 
know” (A237/B296).
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attempting a genetic account of consciousness that can articulate not only its 
various moments and modes, but the sweep and direction of its movement 
from prepredicative passivity to reasoned, judicative judgment.25 According 
to that analysis, questioning is “a peculiar active mode of behavior of the 
ego” that is “originally motivated by events in the passive sphere.”26 Despite 
the modest treatment it receives, questioning is the phenomenon by which 
Husserl can provide an account of the “striving” and “will to decision” 
of the ego with which the text is primarily concerned. Questions are the 
levers of transformation that propels consciousness, now understood as 
inquiring consciousness, from its passive Urdoxa to various forms of higher 
and founded activity. It is a “striving for decision.”27 Questioning further 
reveals the practical, we might even say ethical, dimension of conscious 
intentionality, insofar as it reveals “the essential striving of the ego for 
the unanimity of its acts of position-taking” and so results in “an original 
impulse to get out of this condition and into the normal condition of unity.” 
This suggests a double transcendence to the question: that of consciousness 
towards truth, but also the movement from knowing to doing:  “All reason 
is at the same time practical reason… [and] is always at the point of passing 
over to corresponding volitions, endeavors, activities, to testing the method 
of solution, etc.”28
While Husserl’s account points to a persistent question in phenomenol-
ogy – that of motivation – and while it begins to answer this in a fruitful 
way, its analysis is hampered by an unwarranted assumption and an unwar-
ranted bracketing. In the first place, Husserl assumes that all questioning 
is a modification of doubt (which is itself a modalizaiton of our unreflec-
tive certainty in the existence of the world). In the midst of our uncritical 
believing-in we are suddenly presented with “a unified field of problematic 
possibilities.” Questioning responds to the tension produced by such an 
25  Anthony Steinbock in his preface to his own translation of two of Husserl’s essays on 
this matter, suggests that static phenomenology is characterized by (1) a constitutive approach 
concerned with how something is given, i.e., with modes of givenness and (2) a concern 
for essential structures. Genetic phenomenology carries both the sense of genealogy and 
development. It is thus concerned with (1) “primordial constitution” (passive genesis), (2) 
the genesis between (or from) passive and active spheres of experiences and genesis within 
the purely active sphere of experience (i.e., rational acts). Such an account of the genesis of 
consciousness must also account for its development and therefore inquire as to a certain 
teleology in view of which certain motivations produce the transformation of an Uroosa into, 
ultimately, the judicative assertions that constitute natural science. It is ultimately questions 
that play a key role in the “striving” of consciousness towards such an end. See Steinbock, 
“Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology: Introduction to Two Essays”, Continental 
Philosophy Review 31: 127-134, 1998 (Netherlands: Kluwer, 1998), 129.
26  Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 307.
27  According to that analysis, this desire for decision drives us from “simple questions” 
to “questions involving justification” that demand “additional assurance, of justifying and 
corroborating the judgment of perception” (311).
28  Ibid., 308, 309
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event by an “active doubting.”29 Here it seems relevant to press Husserl on 
the assumption that all questioning is a form of doubt. Doubting seems to 
presuppose a set of contrary possibilities (even if one remains unthematic) 
and therefore to occur within a closed horizon. This certainly can be the case, 
but is it always so? Is there not also a questioning that is a mode of wonder? 
And if so, is not the horizon of such wonder not bound by a defined set of 
competing possibilities, but rather by (infinite) possibility as such? 
Secondly, Husserl brackets the essential and three-way relatedness of 
questioning.30 Yet, the dialogical structure of a question is essential to its 
phenomenological description. The relatedness of questioning is the very 
heart of the Wunder of rationality Husserl described in this Grenzeproblem 
(Grenze = boundary). It is in a sense miraculous (wunderbar) that our ques-
tioning is not in vain with respect to either that which occasioned it nor 
that towards which it tends, that “rational-teleological” way in which the 
world is present to us and we to ourselves. “Here we clearly have a sense 
in which the mind is a ‘grace’. That is, the responsible use of the mind itself 
is dependent on an a priori of genesis, which rides on a fact for which we 
are not responsible. … It is wonderful but true that consciousness is not 
a capricious flow of facts that could indifferently be something else.”31 
Questions in their possibility as well as their reasonable expectation of 
fulfillment are the original witnesses to this. It would seem a betrayal of 
phenomenological method to begin from possible answers and work back-
wards to permissible questions. In its original manifestation, questioning 
is given and characterized by a fundamental unrestrictedness, which is 
hidden from our seeing when reason is prematurely bound and unable 
to ask what it will.  
Heidegger does not bracket the complex phenomenality of the question, 
but renders it in terms of its Gefragtes, Befragtes, and Erfragtes – that which 
is asked about, that which is interrogated, that which is discovered in the 
questioning. Nor is interrogation divorced from the interrogator: to question, 
to be in question, and to be the being that questions is the nature of Dasein.32 
Inquirer is the first name for Dasein: “The very asking of this question is an 
entity’s mode of Being.”33 The great premise of Being and Time is that to be 
able to question presupposes a relation however unthematic and imprecise 
between the questioner and its intended term. 
May we not then think of our questioning as a primary mode of tran-
scendence? Is not to question – if we are to make an adequate response 
29  Ibid. 308. 
30  “Questioning is normally that which is addressed to another or oneself as if another 
[about something].” “We can leave that out of account.” Ibid., 308-309.
31  Jim Hart, “Husserlian Philosophical Theology”, in Essays in Phenomenological Theology, 
127. 
32  “Inquiry itself is the behavior of a questioner.” (Heidegger, op. cit., 5).
33  Ibid., 7.
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to young Meno – always already to be in partial relation to an answer? 
When we question we are already in search of a “known unknown.” Such 
intending is heuristic, anticipatory, prone to error, but never radically sep-
arated. The completely ignorant man asks no questions. To question, then, 
or perhaps more accurately, to be gripped by a question is adopt the pos-
ture of openness that allows for the manifestation of being. If this is true, 
we might suggest in merely heuristic fashion that being is that which is 
brought to manifestation and known through all correct answers to every 
possible question.  
Lastly, to bring us back to Ricoeur and the essay with which we began, 
the right kinds of questions are crucial for the appropriation of reality 
because they put us at stake. For Ricoeur a properly philosophical herme-
neutics does not ask merely exegetical questions. That is, what he calls 
“truth without belief, truth at a distance.”34 True questions and their answers 
require that we believe in them. Truth without belief asks nothing of us. 
In this sense – this ethical sense – questions not only hold open the possi-
bility of transcending any given horizon, but more radically, invite us in 
the search for their answers and, in the appropriation of those answers, to 
surpass ourselves. 
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